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Abstract: The literature on the common pool resource problem in budgeting has thus far not 
explored the likely interaction between ‘size fragmentation’ (the number of decision makers) and 
‘procedural fragmentation’ (the structure of the process in which they interact). The argument 
put forward in this paper is that the effects of these two types of fragmentation should not be 
additive, but multiplicative, since theory suggests that the impact of size fragmentation on fiscal 
policy is conditional on the extent of procedural fragmentation. Using panel data for 57 countries 
over the period 1975 to 1998, I empirically investigate this interaction in the legislative context 
and find strong evidence that partisan fragmentation is associated with higher deficits only when 
it is not moderated by limits on parliamentary amendment authority. 
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Balancing the budget is like going to heaven. Everybody wants to do it. 
They just don't want to do what you have to do to make the trip. 
 
US Senator Phil Grammi 
 
 
The common pool resource problem can severely undermine prudent fiscal policy. The literature 
highlights diverse aspects of this problem, including the role of budget institutions (Von Hagen, 
1992; Alesina et al., 1999) and partisan variables (Volkerink & De Haan, 2001; Perotti & 
Kontopoulos, 2002). Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002, p. 192) contribute an analytically valuable 
distinction between ‘size fragmentation’ (the number of decision makers) and ‘procedural 
fragmentation’ (the structure of the process in which they interact). Surprisingly, however, their 
empirical work does not consider the interaction between these two types of fragmentation, 
although the theoretical case for doing so is very strong. Several other papers consider different 
facets of the fragmentation hypothesis, but similarly fail to account for this possibility, including 
Volkerink and De Haan (2001), Woo (2003), Fabrizio and Mody (2006), and Elgie and 
McMenamin (2008). As a result, we still know very little about whether budgetary procedures 
can mitigate the adverse fiscal effects of multiple fiscal decision makers. 
 
In this paper, I argue that the fiscal impact of size fragmentation should be conditional on 
procedural fragmentation, and empirically investigate this hypothesis. The conceptual discussion 
explains how the interaction of these different types of fragmentation should produce distinct 
fiscal outcomes. I offer an empirical test based on a panel dataset comprising 57 countries over 
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the 1975 to 1998 period. Other studies of the common pool resource problem in budgeting have 
tended to focus on much smaller samples of countries in Western Europe or Latin America, or 
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Therefore, 
the analysis in this paper contributes both a unified conceptual approach as well as a broadly 
based empirical test to the literature. The paper has three main parts: a discussion of the different 
types of fragmentation; an overview of the variables, data, and some methodological issues; 
followed by the empirical model and the results. The conclusion points out policy implications 
and possibilities for further research. 
 
 
1. Types of fragmentation 
 
Theoretical work on the common pool resource problem in budgeting highlights that a 
proliferation of fiscal decision makers gives rise to fiscal indiscipline (Weingast et al., 1981; Von 
Hagen & Harden, 1995; Velasco, 2000). However, institutional arrangements can mitigate fiscal 
illusion by vesting strategic power in actors who are likely to internalize costs, such as the 
finance minister or prime minister (Von Hagen & Harden, 1995). This suggests that the fiscal 
impact of fragmented decision making depends on two types of fragmentation (Perotti & 
Kontopoulos, 2002, p. 192): the number of decision makers, or ‘size fragmentation’, and the 
structure of the process in which they interact, or ‘procedural fragmentation’. Depending on the 
relevant decision making unit, size fragmentation can refer to the number of individual policy 
makers or political parties. Procedural fragmentation refers to the degree to which the design of 
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the budget process allows the finance minister to protect the revenue pool from special interest 
claims. 
 
Early cross-national studies tended to focus on one of these types of fragmentation. For instance, 
Von Hagen and Harden (1995) present results for 12 European Union countries that show an 
association between budget institutions and deficit and debt during the 1980s (see also Von 
Hagen, 1992). Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes, and Stein (1999) apply a similar approach to 20 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. They find an association between budget institutions 
and primary deficits in the 1980s and early 1990s (see also Stein et al., 1998). In contrast, 
Volkerink and De Haan’s (2001) study of deficits in 22 OECD countries over the 1971 to 1996 
period includes several measures of size fragmentation in the legislature and the executive, with 
some significant results. However, they ignore the structure of the budget process.ii 
 
Only more recently have some authors begun to incorporate measures of both size and 
procedural fragmentation into their analyses. Notably, Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) consider 
the association of the number of parties in a coalition and the number of spending ministers with 
several fiscal indicators in 19 OECD countries over the 1970 to 1995 period. They also include 
procedural variables, namely the use of fiscal targets and the nature of negotiations between the 
finance minister and spending ministers. However, they ignore the legislative arena and, 
crucially, do not explore the possible interaction between their measures of size and procedural 
fragmentation. Woo (2003) runs a battery of regressions with a sample of 57 countries between 
1970 and 1990 to investigate the association of a range of economic, political, and institutional 
variables with deficits. The interaction between size and procedural fragmentation is not 
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considered. Fabrizio and Mody (2006) study the determinants of primary balances in ten Eastern 
European countries between 1997 and 2003, including a measure of government fragmentation 
as well as a detailed index of budget institutions borrowed from the work of Gleich (2003) and 
Yläoutinen (2004). Despite explicitly setting out to investigate whether budget institutions 
counteract political indiscipline, Fabrizio and Mody (2006) do not investigate the interaction 
between these variables. Some cross-national studies have considered how budget institutions 
interact with other variables (Hallerberg & Marier, 2004; Alt & Lassen, 2006), but the 
interaction between size and procedural fragmentation has yet to be explored. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 1 offers a simplified representation of the likely interaction between the two concepts of 
fragmentation distinguished by Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002). The vertical axis measures size 
fragmentation, i.e. the number of budgetary decision makers. The horizontal axis measures 
procedural fragmentation, i.e. the extent to which strategic power is centralized in the hands of 
an actor with incentives to internalize costs. Figure 1 helps to clarify under what conditions size 
fragmentation can be expected to lead to fiscal indiscipline. First, consider the possible outcomes 
when procedural fragmentation is low. Where both size fragmentation and procedural 
fragmentation are low, there is no threat at all to fiscal discipline. When size fragmentation is 
high but the design of the budget process centralizes decision making, adverse fiscal effects can 
be contained. Now consider the two groups of possible outcomes with high procedural 
fragmentation. Where procedural fragmentation is high but size fragmentation is low, the budget 
process could potentially favor loose fiscal policy. However, the theory of common pool 
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resources suggests that the limited number of decision makers induces fiscal restraint, as they 
internalize a large share of the costs. However, when many decision makers operate without 
institutional safeguards, the common pool resource problem leads to fiscal indiscipline. 
 
Hence, contrary to what much of the empirical literature at least implicitly suggests, the 
argument put forward here is that neither size nor procedural fragmentation per se need to give 
rise to fiscal indiscipline. Rather, it should be the coincidence of both types of fragmentation that 
produces this outcome. Put differently, the effects of size fragmentation and procedural 
fragmentation should not be additive, but multiplicative, since the impact of size fragmentation 
on fiscal policy is conditional on the extent of procedural fragmentation in the budget process. 
 
 
2. Variables, data, and methods 
 
For the empirical investigation, I use a panel of 57 countries over the 1975 to 1998 period. 
Dictatorship and authoritarian rule are inimical to the representative function of political actors 
that underpins the logic of the common pool resource problem. For instance, a military dictator 
might suspend the legislature or replace its members with appointed cronies. Hence, I exclude 
years of strongly impaired democracy or non-democracy as indicated by a Freedom House score 
larger than 3.5.iii The dependent variable is the central government budget deficit. The economic 
controls include the natural logarithm of inflation and annual GDP growth (as in Hallerberg & 
Marier, 2004), as well as trade openness measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by 
GDP (see Alesina et al., 1999). Inflation can affect budgets in various ways, although the 
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direction is hard to predict. For instance, an associated increase in interest rates may push up debt 
servicing costs, while bracket creep and delayed adjustment of non-indexed spending items help 
to improve the budget balance. Economic growth is likely to increase tax revenues and at the 
same time reduce the demand for some types of social spending in particular, resulting in a 
positive impact on the budget balance. Trade openness can help to reduce deficits by generating 
trade-related revenues such as import and export duties. Moreover, exposure to market forces 
may compel governments to adopt a more prudent fiscal stance than under limited openness. 
 
In addition, I add several political variables. Notably, to account for electoral budget cycles 
(Franzese, 2002; Brender & Drazen, 2005), I use a dummy to indicate years of legislative 
elections. I also speculate that left parties in government might be more profligate than 
administrations from the centre or the right of the political spectrum (Volkerink & De Haan, 
2001) and control for a head of government from a left-of-centre party. Finally, I include a 
dummy set equal to one for the 12 original Eurozone members in each year starting with 1992, 
when the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty paved the way for monetary union. This process is 
associated with improvements in the budget balance, although the sustainability of this effect is 
contested (Milesi-Ferretti, 2003; Koen & Van den Noord, 2005). Refer to Appendix 1 for full 
variable definitions and data sources, and Appendix 2 for summary statistics. 
 
Measures of procedural fragmentation are hard to come by for this unusually large sample. 
Existing surveys of budget institutions cover a much smaller number of countries and shorter 
time periods. To obtain a relevant measure of procedural fragmentation in the legislative budget 
process, I collected data on budgetary amendment rules for all countries in the dataset, using 
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constitutions, legislative rules, as well as secondary sources (see Table 1). There are very good 
reasons for using this variable to indicate procedural fragmentation in the legislature. First, a 
minimum of two separate sources for the relevant provisions in each country ensures a high 
degree of confidence in the accuracy of the data. Moreover, this is the only variable that 
consistently features in every cross-national index of budget institutions to capture the role of the 
legislature in fiscal policy decisions (Von Hagen, 1992; Alesina et al., 1999; Gleich, 2003; 
Hallerberg & Marier, 2004; Yläoutinen, 2004; Fabrizio & Mody, 2006; Hallerberg et al., 2007 
and forthcoming). Other indicators of procedural fragmentation in the legislature have been 
suggested, such as reversionary budget provisions (Alesina et al., 1999), the structure of the 
committee system (Crain & Muris, 1995), bicameralism (Heller, 1997), and the sequencing of 
the voting process in the legislature (Von Hagen, 1992). However, these are not uniformly used 
in empirical work, and the relevance of some of these features is contested.iv Hence, there is an 
exceptionally high degree of consensus in the literature that powers of amendment are central to 
understanding the role of the legislature in fiscal policy decisions. 
 
The data in Table 1 yield different measures of procedural fragmentation in the legislature. First, 
I construct a dummy variable indicating whether legislative amendments are unfettered or 
limited. If there is a limit on changes during the approval stage of the budget process, the 
executive has agenda setting powers and can contain legislative profligacy. I also construct two 
dummies to separate those restrictions that do not allow the legislature to increase expenditures 
from those that prohibit the approval of a higher deficit than in the draft budget. There is 
anecdotal evidence that deficit-based restrictions may be less effective. For instance, Brazilian 
legislators have circumvented a constitutional prohibition to increase deficits through unrealistic 
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upward revisions of revenue estimates (Blöndal et al., 2003, p. 118). The distinction between 
these two main types of amendment constraints provides an additional robustness check for the 
empirical analysis. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Unfortunately, there is no similarly comprehensive information on the strategic power of the 
minister of finance vis-à-vis her cabinet colleagues. Different surveys of budget institutions are 
diverse in terms of countries, time periods, and measurement. Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes, and 
Stein (1996, Appendix B) asked budget directors in Latin American and Caribbean countries: 
‘Does the minister of finance have more authority than the spending ministers regarding the 
budget?’ Although there is some overlap with the sample used here, there is insufficient 
variation, as 18 out of 20 respondents indicated that these powers were ‘considerabl[y] greater… 
(formally and in practice)’. Moreover, as Hallerberg and Marier (2004, p. 578) point out, this 
measure reveals nothing about the way in which the power of finance ministers differs across 
countries. Building on the work by Von Hagen (1992), Hallerberg, Strauch, and Von Hagen 
(2007 and forthcoming) document the evolution of several institutional features to assess the 
authority of European Union finance ministers, for example the power to impose ceilings on the 
bids of spending ministers during the budget drafting process, and authority to block the 
disbursement of funds during budget execution. However, overlap with the dataset used here is 
limited to 15 countries and only a part of the sample period. There is relevant work on budget 
institutions in Central and Eastern European countries (Gleich, 2003; Yläoutinen, 2004; Fabrizio 
& Mody, 2006), but these recent democracies are not included in the dataset used here. Finally, 
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Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002, pp. 220-221) experiment with indicators of spending limits and 
the nature of intra-executive budget negotiations. However, these are very selective and again 
limited to a subset of OECD countries. 
 
Due to the lack of comprehensive cross-national data on procedural fragmentation in the 
executive, the focus here is on the legislative arena. The theory of common pool resources 
suggests that a legislature has greater potential for profligacy than a cabinet, because it typically 
comprises substantially more actors.v Hence, my expectation is that the interaction between size 
fragmentation and procedural constraints in the legislative arena should be highly relevant for 
fiscal policy outcomes. If the analysis finds evidence for this argument despite the limitations of 
the available data, this would signal that further empirical work is warranted to test the full 
implications of the interactive logic. Hence, an important task for future work would be to 
contribute an analysis of the interaction of size and procedural fragmentation in the cabinet. To 
carry out such work with large samples requires new and more extensive institutional datasets. 
 
There are different possible approaches to measuring size fragmentation, depending on whether 
the relevant decision making unit is a political party, an individual politician, or both. In the 
legislative arena, the number of seats is hardly changing or completely time-invariant in most 
countries, and therefore highly correlated with the country fixed effects in the empirical approach 
pursued here (see below). Hence, my focus is on partisan fragmentation, which varies much 
more within countries over time. Moreover, in most countries it is reasonable to assume a degree 
of party discipline. In the political science literature, a popular measure of party political 
fragmentation is Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) ‘effective number of parties’ (ENOP): 
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ENOP = 
€ 
Partyi2i=1
n∑( )
−1
 
 
In this equation, Partyi denotes the share of seats of political party i in the lower house of the 
legislature (or unicameral parliament) and n is the total number of parties represented. This 
measure has gained a high degree of acceptance, although it is not without its quirks (Dunleavy 
& Boucek, 2003). One of its undesirable properties is that it has no predefined upper bound, 
which can result in extreme positive skews in the distribution of this variable. This makes the 
measure problematic for some datasets, in particular those that are not narrowly focused on the 
traditional set of Western European or OECD countries.vi For this reason, I prefer another 
Herﬁndahl-like index of partisan fragmentation: 
 
Partisan fragmentation = 
€ 
1− Partyi2i=1
n∑  
 
This equation generates values between zero (one-party rule) and very close to one (every seat in 
the lower house or unicameral parliament is held by a different political party or independents). 
By giving less weight to small parties, this measure is better at dealing with extreme outliers at 
the upper end of the distribution.vii Also, this size-weighted measure is preferable to the 
unweighted number of parties, which is equally bad at dealing with outliers as Laakso and 
Taagepera’s ENOP. Moreover, large parties are also likely to internalize a large share of the cost 
of their actions, so the theory of common pool resources implies the use of a size-weighted 
measure (Franzese, 2008). As a robustness check, I include the equivalent variable for the 
executive. Ideally, the partisan fragmentation of the cabinet should be calculated with data on the 
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party affiliation of individual spending ministers. However, this information is not readily 
available. Assuming that portfolios are typically distributed with consideration of the relative 
seat shares of the governing parties in the legislature, the Government partisan fragmentation 
variable used here serves as a proxy. The data for these two variables are from the World Bank’s 
April 2008 update of the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). 
 
With regard to estimation, the possibility that fiscal performance affects the choice of budget 
institutions can make it difficult to identify causal effects. This issue is well known in the 
political economy literature, but has proven difficult to address (Acemoglu, 2005; Fabrizio & 
Mody, 2006, p. 703). Alesina and Perotti (1996, p. 4) point out that institutional features that are 
costly to change and adjusted rarely can be considered exogenous ‘at least in the short to medium 
run’. In this case, there is hardly any over-time variation in legislative amendment powers, which 
are constant over the sample period in all countries except for changes in Peru (1991), Argentina 
(1993), and New Zealand (1996). Moreover, the reform in New Zealand is inconsequential for 
the coding scheme used here (see Table 1 for details). A fixed effects approach is desirable, as it 
mitigates concerns about unobserved heterogeneity by eliminating bias from time-constant 
omitted variables. In this instance, the unit fixed effects will also absorb much of the explanatory 
power of the rarely changing institutional variables, but there is sufficient within-country 
variation in partisan fragmentation. Hence, the focus here is on how changes in partisan 
fragmentation affect deficits, given a particular institutional setting. 
 
 
3. Empirical model and results 
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The discussion in section one unequivocally points to an interactive model (Brambor et al., 2006; 
Kam & Franzese, 2007). Accordingly, I model the central government budget deficit in country i 
at time t as follows: 
 
Deficiti,t = β1(Partisan fragmentationi,t) + β2(Amendment limiti,t) + β3(Partisan fragmentationi,t × 
Amendment limiti,t) + β4(Deficiti,t-1) + β5(Controlsi,t) + Countryi + Yeart + εi,t 
 
The coefficient β1 represents the effect of a one-unit increase in partisan fragmentation when 
there are no amendment limits, while β2 captures the effect of the imposition of such a limit 
under perfect one-party rule. The coefficient β3 indicates by how much the effect of partisan 
fragmentation on deficits changes with the imposition of an amendment limit. I include the set of 
controls discussed in the previous section, as well as a lagged dependent variable, since a fiscal 
outcome in any given year is to a large extent determined by the outcome in the preceding year 
(Davis et al., 1966). A Hausman test indicates that random effects are not appropriate. Hence, I 
use the OLS fixed effects estimator, where the unit fixed effects capture any country-specific 
unchanging features.viii Given the rarely changing nature of the institutional conditioning 
variable, it is highly correlated with the country fixed effects. Therefore, the focus here is on β1 
and β3. In addition, T - 1 year effects capture common shocks (Greene, 2003, p. 291), and ε is an 
error term. 
 
The above regression equation can be used to identify the marginal effect of partisan 
fragmentation: 
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∂(Deficiti,t) / ∂(Partisan fragmentationi,t) = β1 + β3(Amendment limiti,t) 
 
In this analysis, the conditioning variable is binary and simply indicates the presence or absence 
of limits on legislative amendments to the budget. Unlike in purely linear-additive models, β1 has 
to be interpreted as a conditional coefficient representing the effect of a one-unit increase in 
partisan fragmentation on the deficit when such an amendment constraint is absent (i.e. 
Amendment limit = 0). Conversely, the sum of β1 and β3 captures the effect of a one-unit increase 
in partisan fragmentation in the presence of such a constraint (i.e. Amendment limit = 1). The 
discussion in this paper leads me to expect a positive sign for β1, since in the absence of an 
effective amendment limit an increase in the number of decision makers is predicted to lead to 
higher deficits (the dependent variable is coded so that a positive value represents a deficit and a 
negative value represents a surplus). As the presence of an amendment constraint is predicted to 
dampen this effect, I expect a negative sign for β3 so that (β1 + β3) < β1. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 presents the results. In column (1), I add only Partisan fragmentation and Amendment 
limit to the set of controls. The coefficient for partisan fragmentation has a negative sign and is 
far from significant. In column (2), I interact the two variables, as specified in the statistical 
model. According to the results, a switch from one-party rule to full partisan fragmentation 
increases deficits by a massive 5.7 percentage points of GDP when there are no limits on 
legislative amendments. More realistically, an increase from two to three parties with equal seat 
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shares in the legislature (i.e. an increase in partisan fragmentation from .5 to .67) is predicted to 
add .95 percentage points to the deficit to GDP ratio. This effect is significant at the 1% level. 
Under these institutional conditions, partisan fragmentation results in fiscal indiscipline. As 
expected, the interaction term has a negative sign, and it is also significant at the 1% level. To 
assess the effect of an increase in partisan fragmentation in the presence of an institutional 
constraint, the bottom of Table 2 also presents the additionally required conditional coefficient(s) 
and standard error(s) for each interactive model. The relevant coefficient reported in column (2) 
has a negative sign but is not significant at conventional levels. In other words, when legislative 
amendment authority is circumscribed, an increase in partisan fragmentation has no significant 
effect on budget deficits. Apart from the lagged dependent variable, the estimates for the controls 
show that deficits increase in election years and that trade openness improves fiscal performance. 
None of the other control variables achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. 
 
Graphical exposition can aid the interpretation of conditional marginal effects (Kam & Franzese, 
2007). Figure 2 summarizes the marginal effect of partisan fragmentation on deficits by 
institutional setting, based on the results in column (2). With an amendment limit, the 95% 
confidence interval includes zero. Conversely, with unfettered amendment powers, the marginal 
effect of partisan fragmentation is statistically distinguishable from zero. Moreover, there is no 
overlap between the two sets of confidence intervals. This indicates that the marginal effect of 
partisan fragmentation is statistically distinguishable across the two institutional groups. These 
results are fully in line with the expectations summarized in Figure 1: Under conditions of 
procedural fragmentation, size fragmentation leads to fiscal indiscipline. However, with 
procedural constraints, this effect is contained – and very effectively so, these results suggest. 
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[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The remaining columns in Table 2 present several robustness checks. One possible critique is 
that formal institutional arrangements and partisan fragmentation may not be as relevant in 
weakly entrenched democracies (Acemoglu, 2005; Elgie & McMenamin, 2008). In column (3), I 
restrict the sample to countries that have a score of .1 or higher on the Age variable calculated by 
Persson and Tabellini (2003), which measures the age of democracy. This cut-off limits the 
sample to countries that had democratized by 1980. Indeed, the hypothesized effect is stronger in 
countries with consolidated democracy. Also note that trade openness does not have a significant 
effect in this sample. In column (4), I limit the sample period to all years from 1975 up to and 
including 1990. This means that the institutional conditioning variable is completely time 
invariant and fully absorbed by the country fixed effects. The results for the variables of interest 
are substantively similar to those in column (2). Interestingly, legislative elections have no 
significant effect in column (4), which may suggest that electoral manipulation plays a greater 
role in more recent years. As explained above, in the absence of a measure of procedural 
fragmentation in the cabinet, the interactive argument cannot be explored in the executive 
context. However, in column (5) I include a measure of partisan fragmentation in the 
government. This variable is not significant and its inclusion does not substantively affect the 
results. Finally, I distinguish spending and deficit-based amendment constraints.ix Column (6) 
suggests that both counteract the effect of an increase in partisan fragmentation, and there is no 
significant difference in the size of the coefficients for the two interaction terms. 
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I conducted additional robustness checks, which are not reported here to conserve space. One 
possible critique is that the impact of the European Monetary Union is not adequately modeled. 
In effect, I have assumed that Maastricht resulted in an immediate structural shift in budget 
balances in the first 12 countries to enter into monetary union. It is more likely that any effect of 
Europe’s fiscal rules was gradual (Volkerink & De Haan, 2001, p. 236). Hence, I also allowed 
for the average effect of Maastricht on these 12 countries to differ for each year in the run-up to 
monetary union. The results suggest that monetary union had a significant negative effect on 
deficits in the EU12 only in the two years immediately prior to 1999, when the euro became a 
real currency. While this finding is of interest on its own, most important in this context is that 
the estimated conditional coefficients for partisan fragmentation are not affected. As a final 
robustness check, I ran a jackknife test in which I estimated model (2) 57 times, each time 
excluding all observations from one of the countries. The results remained stable no matter 
which country was excluded. In sum, there is robust evidence that partisan fragmentation in the 
legislature is associated with fiscal indiscipline only when constraints on amendments are absent. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The literature on the common pool resource problem in budgeting has explored the fiscal impact 
of a variety of aspects of fragmented decision making. However, previous empirical work pays 
insufficient attention to the likely interaction between size and procedural fragmentation. The 
argument put forward in this paper is that the effects of these two types of fragmentation should 
not be additive, but multiplicative, since the impact of size fragmentation on fiscal policy is 
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conditional on the extent of procedural fragmentation in the budget process. Using panel data for 
57 countries over the period 1975 to 1998, I find consistent evidence that partisan fragmentation 
in the legislature is associated with higher deficits only when it is not moderated by limits on 
parliamentary amendment authority. 
 
This finding has potentially far-reaching policy implications. Notably, electoral reformers should 
consider very carefully how the broader institutional environment might condition the economic 
effects of a possible change in partisan fragmentation. For example, if a country were to 
undertake reforms that increase representation, by switching from a plurality rule electoral 
system to one based on proportional representation with a low threshold, then the results 
presented here suggest that the likely fiscal ramifications of this reform depend on the budgetary 
powers of the legislature. Moreover, given that these powers are highly durable, initial 
constitutional choices can shape fiscal policy outcomes for decades to come. Hence, in particular 
in the context of fundamental regime change, when there is a unique window of opportunity to 
reconsider and design a range of political structures, attention needs too be paid to the likely 
interaction between voter preferences, electoral systems, and budget institutions. 
 
Further work is warranted. Notably, this analysis lacked an indicator of procedural fragmentation 
in the executive to replicate and complement the analysis of the legislative arena. While the 
literature on the common pool resource problem in budgeting has identified a number of relevant 
variables, suitable data are simply not available for a larger set of countries and over an extended 
time period. With comprehensive data on procedural fragmentation in the executive as well as 
the legislature, the interactive argument could be tested more fully. Moreover, it would be 
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possible to take the underlying logic even further, for instance by exploring the interaction of 
fragmentation at different stages of the budget process. This requires new data gathering efforts 
to obtain more fine-grained institutional measures for a large number of countries. The results 
presented here suggest that the payoffs of such work for our understanding of fiscal policy 
outcomes could be substantial. In the next generation of research on fiscal performance, these 
multiplicative relationships deserve thorough attention. 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions and sources 
 
AGE: Age of democracy, defined as: AGE = (2000 – first year of democratic rule) / 200 and 
varying between 0 and 1, with the US being the oldest democracy (value of 1). Source: Persson 
& Tabellini (2003; corrected version dated June 2003). 
AMENDMENT LIMIT: Dummy variable, equal to 1 if either Spending limit or Deficit limit 
equal to 1, 0 otherwise. Source: Table 1. 
DEFICIT LIMIT: Dummy variable, equal to 1 if legislative amendments can increase spending 
but not the deficit in the executive’s budget proposal, 0 otherwise. Source: Table 1. 
DEFICIT: Central government budget deficit (if positive) or surplus (if negative), as a 
percentage of GDP. Source: Variable SPL in Persson & Tabellini (2003; corrected version dated 
June 2003), multiplied by -1. 
EU12 IN 199X: Dummy variable, equal to 1 for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain for the year 199x, zero 
otherwise, where 1 < x < 9. 
EU12: Dummy variable, equal to 1 for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain from 1992 onwards, zero 
otherwise. 
FREEDOM: Freedom House combined average scores, ranging from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). 
Source: www.freedomhouse.org (accessed May 2008). 
GDP GROWTH: GDP growth (annual per cent). Source: World Bank (2007). 
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GOVERNMENT PARTISAN FRAGMENTATION: One minus the sum of the squared seat 
shares of all parties in the government. Independents are counted as single-member political 
parties. Source: Beck et al. (2001; April 2008 update). 
LEFT CHIEF EXECUTIVE: Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the head of government is from a 
political party at the left of the ideological spectrum. Source: Author’s calculations based on the 
variable EXECRLC in Beck et al. (2001; April 2008 update). 
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS: Dummy variable for legislative elections, equal to 1 in the year 
the legislature is elected. Source: Persson & Tabellini (2003; corrected version dated June 2003). 
LOG OF INFLATION: Natural logarithm of consumer price inflation (annual per cent). Source: 
World Bank (2007). 
PARTISAN FRAGMENTATION: One minus the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in 
the legislature. Independents are counted as single-member political parties. Source: Beck et al. 
(2001; April 2008 update). 
SPENDING LIMIT: Dummy variable, equal to 1 if legislative amendments cannot increase the 
spending total in the executive’s budget proposal, 0 otherwise. Source: Table 1. 
TRADE OPENNESS: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
GDP. Source: Persson & Tabellini (2003; corrected version dated June 2003). 
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Amendment limit 1162 0.619 0.486 0 1 
Deficit 1050 3.423 4.373 -22.631 21.057 
Deficit limit 1162 0.060 0.238 0 1 
EU12 1162 0.072 0.259 0 1 
Freedom 1162 1.814 0.861 1.000 3.500 
GDP growth 1155 3.392 3.722 -14.803 26.139 
Government partisan fragmentation 1115 0.230 0.279 0.000 0.993 
Left chief executive 1121 0.327 0.469 0 1 
Legislative elections 1161 0.279 0.449 0 1 
Log of inflation 1148 2.088 1.335 -4.074 9.372 
Partisan fragmentation 1112 0.615 0.163 0.000 0.993 
Spending limit 1162 0.559 0.497 0 1 
Trade openness 1138 70.287 38.724 8.868 208.643 
Note: Only observations where Freedom ≤ 3.5 are included. 
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Figure 1: Types of fragmentation and fiscal performance 
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Table 1: Legislative powers to amend the budget 
Country Amendment limit Country Amendment limit 
Argentina None / Deficit a Ireland Spending c 
Australia Spending Italy None 
Austria None Japan Spending d 
Bahamas Spending Luxembourg None 
Barbados Spending Malaysia Spending 
Belgium None Malta Spending 
Belize Spending Mauritius Spending 
Bolivia None Mexico Deficit 
Botswana Spending Nepal Spending c 
Brazil Deficit Netherlands None 
Canada Spending New Zealand Spending e 
Chile Spending Nicaragua Deficit 
Colombia Spending Norway None 
Costa Rica Deficit Papua New Guinea Spending 
Cyprus Spending Paraguay None 
Denmark None Peru None / Spending f 
Dominican Republic Spending b Philippines Spending 
Ecuador Spending Portugal None 
El Salvador Spending Spain Spending 
Fiji Spending Sri Lanka Spending 
Finland None Sweden None 
France Spending Switzerland None 
Gambia Spending c Thailand Spending 
Germany None Turkey Spending g 
Greece None United Kingdom Spending 
Guatemala None Uruguay Spending 
Honduras None United States None 
Iceland None Venezuela Spending 
India Spending   
Sources: Constitutions, parliamentary standing orders, Inter-Parliamentary Union (1986), Von Hagen (1992), Döring (1995), 
Alesina et al. (1996), OECD (1998 and 2002), Haggard & McCubbins (2001), Santiso (2004), Filc & Scartascini (2006), 
International Budget Project (2006), Wehner (2006). 
Notes:  a Restriction since 1993 (Alesina et al., 1996; Stein et al., 1998).  b Legislative amendments require a two-thirds 
majority, unless initiated by the executive (Art. 115(3) of the Constitution; Alesina et al., 1996; Filc & Scartascini, 2006).  c No 
amendment power, can only accept or reject.  d There is a legal dispute about the extent to which the Diet can amend the budget 
(Sakurai, 2004).  e Since 1996 the Crown has a financial veto over amendments with more than a ‘minor impact’ on allocations 
or fiscal aggregates; previously as in the UK (Standing Orders 312-316; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1986; OECD, 1998; 
Wehner, 2006).  f Restriction since 1991 (Alesina et al., 1996; Stein et al., 1998).  g Restrictions apply in the plenary (Art. 162 
of the Constitution; OECD, 1998; Kraan et al., 2007). 
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Table 2: Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Partisan fragmentation -0.437 5.711 7.101 5.365 5.362 5.910 
 (0.965) (1.997)*** (1.543)*** (2.304)** (2.033)** (1.964)*** 
Amendment limit -1.359 2.945 1.960  2.815  
 (1.194) (1.814) (1.512)  (1.792)  
Partisan fragmentation × Amendment limit  -7.029 -9.495 -6.047 -6.821  
  (2.252)*** (2.184)*** (2.597)** (2.201)***  
Government partisan fragmentation     0.176  
     (0.569)  
Spending limit      0.072 
      (1.557) 
Partisan fragmentation × Spending limit      -7.278 
      (2.312)*** 
Deficit limit      3.867 
      (1.816)** 
Partisan fragmentation × Deficit limit      -6.487 
      (2.713)** 
Lagged deficit 0.645 0.637 0.681 0.656 0.637 0.636 
 (0.053)*** (0.054)*** (0.037)*** (0.049)*** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** 
Legislative elections 0.308 0.308 0.287 0.186 0.306 0.303 
 (0.165)* (0.164)* (0.154)* (0.178) (0.164)* (0.164)* 
Left chief executive 0.242 0.223 0.138 0.360 0.241 0.206 
 (0.298) (0.295) (0.258) (0.292) (0.311) (0.294) 
GDP growth -0.037 -0.037 -0.045 -0.019 -0.038 -0.036 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030) 
Log of inflation -0.003 0.014 0.062 0.062 0.012 0.023 
 (0.094) (0.097) (0.110) (0.150) (0.095) (0.097) 
Trade openness -0.020 -0.020 -0.014 -0.030 -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.010)** (0.010)* (0.013) (0.013)** (0.010)* (0.010)** 
EU12 -0.446 -0.514 -0.454  -0.524 -0.513 
 (0.525) (0.513) (0.485)  (0.527) (0.513) 
Partisan fragmentation | Amendment limit = 1  -1.318 -2.394 -0.682 -1.459  
  (1.075) (1.536) (1.145) (1.179)  
Partisan fragmentation | Spending limit = 1      -1.368 
      (1.162) 
Partisan fragmentation | Deficit limit = 1      -0.577 
      (2.339) 
Observations 969 969 776 665 969 969 
Countries 57 57 40 57 57 57 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Full Full Age ≥ .1 Year ≤ 1990 Full Full 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Only observations where Freedom ≤ 3.5 are included. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Figure 2: The conditional marginal effect of partisan fragmentation on deficits 
 
 
Note: Based on the results in column (2) of Table 2. The lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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i Quoted from the New York Times, September 17, 1990. Available: www.nytimes.com. 
ii Based on a different theoretical argument, the literature on delayed adjustment considers the 
hypothesis that coalition governments find it difficult to modify fiscal policy in the wake of 
economic shocks (Roubini & Sachs, 1989; Edin & Ohlsson, 1991; De Haan et al., 1999). 
Franzese (2008) provides an overview and critiques the dominant empirical approach. 
iii This is also Persson & Tabellini’s (2003) ‘narrow’ definition of democracy. 
iv Notably, Von Hagen (1992, p. 36) initially argued that a global vote on the size of the budget 
prior to allocative decisions contains total spending. However, Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) 
demonstrate that such a two-step process may result in relatively large budgets. Von Hagen later 
revised his view (Hallerberg & Von Hagen, 1997; Ehrhart et al., 2007). 
v In practice, there are always fewer cabinet members than legislators. Moreover, a cabinet is 
also likely to contain fewer partisan actors than the legislature, with possible but rare exceptions 
such as governments of national unity. 
vi For instance, Nepal prior to the 1991 election had a ‘non-party’ system of panchayats 
(councils). For these years, the Database of Political Institutions counts each member of the 
legislature as equivalent to a representative of a unique political party, resulting in scores for the 
(effective) number of parties of up to 140. This produces an extreme outlier in this sample. 
vii Results with a logged version of ENOP are very similar and available upon request. 
viii In dynamic models with fixed effects, a potential problem is Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). 
However, this is less of a concern when the number of time periods is twenty or more (Beck & 
Katz, 2004, p. 15). 
ix Note that Spending limit and Deficit limit are defined here as mutually exclusive types of 
amendment constraints. 
